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Ireland – “the Celtic Tiger economy” – has been the European success
story of the last decade. It is much less widely appreciated however how
poor the country’s economic performance had been over previous decades.
It is conventional today to expect poorer economies, as long as the basic re-
quirements for growth have been met, to exhibit real convergence, i. e. to
grow more rapidly than their richer neighbours. After all, the relative scar-
city of capital in poorer economies should mean a high real return to capi-
tal, which is expected to stimulate high investment rates and strong capi-
tal inflows.
Ireland, however, did not deviate much from around 60 percent of the le-
vel of national income per head in the UK (the country’s single most im-
portant trading partner) between 1913 and 1985.1 Trade liberalisation in
the late 1950s, and EU accession in 1973, nevertheless changed the econo-
mic environment dramatically and sowed the seeds of the rapid real con-
vergence experienced over the last decade or so. The fact that convergence
did not take place until almost two decades of EU membership had passed
is thought-provoking however, and the lessons of the earlier unsuccessful
period – about processes and policies to be avoided – are therefore arguably
as important as the lessons to be learned from an analysis of the count-
ry’s dramatic growth in the 1990s.
EU accession did not then – for quite some time – lead to a change in
the country’s economic fortunes. Accordingly we set the scene, in Section 1,
by considering the economic processes set in motion in the period before EU
accession. Section 2 analyses the performance of the economy between EU
accession and the beginnings of the boom in the late 1980s, and Section 3
discusses the causes and consequences of the Celtic Tiger era.
1. Irish Economic Conditions in the 1950s and 1960s
Ireland emerged from protectionism some time later than the rest of Wes-
tern Europe. Accordingly it missed out on the post-war boom, recording
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1 GNP rather than GDP is adopted as the measure of Irish national income. In earlier periods
Irish GNP exceeded GDP because of the remittances of emigrants. The situation is sharply re-
versed today, with GDP almost 25 percent greater than GNP, because of the high level of pro-
fits accruing to foreign corporations located in Ireland.an annual growth rate of less than 2 percent over the 1950s compared to
one of almost 6 percent in the rest of Western Europe.
Industrial protectionism, introduced in the 1930s, initially raised the rate
of employment growth in manufacturing, from 1.6 percent in the free-trade
years after 1926, to an annual rate of 4.3 percent over the protectionist
1930s and 1940s. By the 1950s however, protectionism had run out of steam
and manufacturing employment growth slowed to a rate of 0.8 percent per
annum over thedecade. Exports increased in response to theEuropean post-
-war boom of course, though these were primarily agricultural in nature.2
Imports of capital and consumer goods increased more rapidly, leading to
a balance of payments crisis which necessitated contractionary aggregate-
-demand policies. Over the course of the 1950s, some 400,000 people out of
a population of less than 3 million emigrated.
These harsh conditions eventually saw a reversal of the protectionist po-
licy, which began to be dismantled in the late 1950s, at around the same
time as Spain and Portugal. A free trade agreement with Ireland’s predo-
minant trading partner, the UK, came into force in 1966 and Ireland joined
the EU (along with the UK and Denmark) in 1973.
The move towards openness was accompanied by theintroduction of azero
tax rate on profits derived from manufactured exports and a liberalisation
of the law on foreign ownership of companies.3 German and US companies,
in particular, were quick to respond to these changes. The total stock of US
FDI in Ireland was USD 6 million in 1958, with over 80 percent of it loca-
ted in the petroleum sector and none in manufacturing. By the time of
EU entry, the stock had risen to USD 269 million (in nominal terms), of
which 90 percent was in manufacturing, with the bulk of the sector’s out-
put being exported.
In sectoral terms, two further SITC-1 sectors – Chemicals and Manufac-
tured Goods Classified by Material (primarily Textiles, Clothing and Foot-
wear) – had joined Food, Beverages and Tobacco as sectors in which Ireland
displayed a revealed comparative advantage at the time of EU entry. Che-
micals, in particular, had grown strongly – from less than one half of 1 per-
cent to 6 percent of exports since the end of the protectionist era, while food
sector exports had declined to 50 percent of the total.
The growth in foreign industry also contributed to a diversification of Ire-
land’s export markets, with the UK share of manufacturing exports falling
from 83 percent in 1959 to 63 percent in 1971, and the then 6-country EEC
share rising from 6 percent to 16 percent over this same period.
The value of the tax regime to these newly entering firms may be discer-
ned from this diversification of export activity away from the UK, even
though in the years preceding accession Ireland faced an average nominal
tariff of over 9 percent on EEC-bound industrial exports (after the imple-
mentation of the Kennedy round of GATT).
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2 As late as 1960, some 30 percent of exports consisted of live animals, another 30 percent were
of other agricultural goods and only 19 percent were of manufactures.
3 As the bulk of the country’s exports at that time were agricultural in nature, there was little
diminution of the tax base when the concessionary tax rate was adopted.Overall manufacturing employment growth had resumed again during
the 1960s, at a rate of 2.3 percent per annum, with much higher producti-
vity growth than during the protectionist period. This overall growth in ma-
nufacturing employment masked a number of contradictory underlying
trends however. On the positive side, employment was increasing in the fo-
reign-owned sector. The expanding sectors within indigenous industry were
of three types: (i) nontraded goods, which enjoyed a degree of natural pro-
tection within the local market, (ii) sectors engaged in processing of local
primary products, and (iii) the few exceptional industries which had had
long-established track records in Ireland and which did not therefore need
to overcome barriers to entry as newcomers (O’Malley, 1989). Manufactu-
ring employment in most other sectors of indigenous industry went into de-
cline in the face of growing import penetration. This was erratic in the early
years of the 1960s but increased rapidly after the Anglo-Irish Free Trade
Agreement of 19664 came into force.
Older people in Ireland look back on the 1960s as a boom period, in con-
trast to the all-pervasive gloom of the 1950s. Yet, as pointed out earlier,
even during this period there was no convergence on UK levels of national
income per head. The increased growth simply matched the levels recorded
elsewhere in this period, which has been termed “the European Golden Age”.
Why should this have been the case? The conventional wisdom in Ireland
is that the lack of convergence in this period is due to the legacy of the long
delay in dropping protectionism, to heavy-handed state involvement in
the economy, and to the fact that Ireland remained about 10 years behind
the rest of Western Europe in increasing educational throughput, as state
funding of secondary-level education was introduced only in 1966. This per-
spective however arises as a consequence of the countries chosen against
which Irish performance is compared. Traditionally, Irish performance was
matched against that of the UK, while more recently it has become con-
ventional to assess performance against the EU average.
In Barry (2003b) however, the present author chooses a different control
group against which to assess the Irish experience. This group consists of
the other EU cohesion economies – those which along with Ireland have
been the traditionally poorest EU member states – i.e. Greece, Spain and
Portugal.
This analysis is vastly informative, particularly for the 1960s, since each
of the cohesion economies other than Ireland experienced rapid real con-
vergence on average EU levels of income per head, as seen in Table 1.
Barry (2003b) shows however that Ireland was no less open than the other
cohesion economies during this period. Each moved towards trade libera-
lisation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, while, in terms of export sha-
res, Ireland was far more open than any of the others. It was no more in-
terventionist in terms of state involvement in the enterprise sector than
were the others, with the possible exception of Greece. Nor did Ireland lag
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4 The trade liberalisation of the period is illustrated by the fact that the average effective tariff
level before the Free Trade Agreement was almost four times the level prevailing in the count-
ry’s trading partners. This had declined to around twice the average level in the run-up to EU
entry in 1973 (McAleese, 1971).behind the other cohesion states in terms of educational throughput. In
this respect it was on a par with Greece and ahead of Spain and Portu-
gal.
Of the factors that growth theory conventionally focuses on, only in
the malfunctioning of its labour market did Ireland appear substantially
different from the other countries.5 In Ireland, strong wage growth, high
unemployment and high emigration coincided. The country at the time had
an unemployment rate that exceeded the EU15 average by about 4 per-
centage points, a labour-productivity growth rate below that of the other
cohesion countries (as well as the EU15) and more rapid real wage growth
than in these other countries.
This suggests that Irish real wages were pitched at too high a level for
labour-intensive industries to prosper. Domestically-owned firms failed
to gain foreign market share while seeing their share of the home mar-
ket eroded. Investment also suffered. Alone of the cohesion countries,
Irish investment as a share of GDP was below the EU15 average. Only
the significant levels of inward FDI propped up the manufacturing sec-
tor.
This experience provides important evidence on the corrosive effects that
labour-market disequilibrium can have on growth and convergence pro-
spects. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) present econometric evidence on this,
and similar results emerge from the simulations of a macrosectoral model
of the Czech economy carried out by Barry, Bradley, Kejak and Vavra (2003).
2. The Irish Economy from EU Accession to the Emergence 
of the Celtic Tiger
Ireland’s accession to the EU in 1973 coincided with the first of the ma-
jor oil shocks of the 1970s and with the slowdown in world productivity
growth that brought an end to Europe’s Golden Age. Eichengreen and Leb-
lang (2003) chart how generally recessionary periods impede convergence.
As seen in Table 1, none of the cohesion countries resumed convergence un-
til the mid- to late 1980s.
Barry (2003b) argues that an important factor behind this general lack
of convergence was a decline in the quality of macroeconomic policymaking
in the cohesion countries. All had higher inflation than the EU average,
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1960 1973 1987 2000
Spain 60 77 74 82
Portugal 40 58 56 72
Greece 44 71 60 68
Ireland 64 61 61 97
TABLE 1 GDP per head, PPS, EU15 = 100 (GNP for Ireland)
Source: European Economy, Statistical Annex, various issues
5 Ireland of course, in contrast to the others, remained democratic throughout the period. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) however find that democracy impacts on growth only – if at all –
through its impact on other relevant independent variables.suggesting excessively lax monetary and/or exchange rate policies, and most
saw a dramatic decline in their fiscal positions.6 This suggests that there
may be something in the political economy of poorer countries that makes
their general macroeconomic stance particularly vulnerable to general eco-
nomic slowdowns.
There is no substantial body of opinion, in Ireland at least, that associa-
ted the decline in Ireland’s economic fortunes during the 1970s with
the country’s accession to the EU. Most accept that the blame is to be laid
on the conduct of domestic macro policy. Hence we will discuss this before
returning to developments at the sectoral and industry level.
The growth in Irish public debt as a proportion of GDP is shown in Fi-
gure 1. The Irish debt crisis, like the broader world debt crisis, came about
as a response to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. The response in Ireland
to the first shock was similar to that of the UK. A counter-cyclical fiscal po-
licy was followed which resulted in a breaking of the traditional rule that
there should be no deficit on the government’s current account. By 1977 ho-
wever, higher taxation and economic recovery had almost halved the cur-
rent budget deficit.
A general election in that year prevented a return to the historical rule, as
the political parties vied with each other in offering tax breaks and promises
of increased public expenditure. The government which took power rapidly
returned the current budget deficit-to-GDP ratio to the levels which had pre-
vailed at the height of the previous recession. This represented a conscious
attempt to provide a strong Keynesian stimulus to the economy. The policy,
however, was strongly pro-cyclical, as can be seen in Figure 2. Employment
boomed and there were historically unprecedented net inflows of migrants
from the UK (with which Ireland shares an open labour market).
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FIGURE  1 General Government Consolidated Gross Debt as Percentage of GDP, 
Ireland and EU11
Source: European Economy, Statistical Annex, various issues
6 It may seen surprising to some that a mix of lax monetary and expansionary fiscal policies
should lead to low growth. Fisher (1993) however shows that inflation and high budget deficits
reduce growth by impacting adversely on both investment and productivity growth. Crafts and
Toniolo (1996) and Barro (1991) focus particularly on the negative effects of growth in public-
-sector consumptionand thedistortions associated either with theexpenditure programmes them-
















































0Barry and Bradley (1991) in a simulation of a macrosectoral model of
the Irish economy found that this fiscal expansion knocked about three
percentage points off the Irish unemployment rate – see Table 2. With
very low multipliers prevailing in the Irish economy however it is no
surprise that this came at the expense of a huge increase in the natio-
nal debt.
With the jump in world interest rates in the early 1980s and a slow-
down in the UK economy which reduced the incentive to migrate, Irish
unemployment grew rapidly. Interest payments and social welfare pay-
ments soared, as seen in Table 3, and the debt ratio began to spiral out
of control. It came to be recognised that the pro-cyclical fiscal expansion
had been a grave mistake. A further pro-cyclical policy, though this time
a contractionary one, would have to be undertaken in response to the cri-
sis.
Patrick Honohan, who worked as an economic advisor to the government
in the early to mid-1980s described (Honohan, 1988) the conventional wis-
dom among policymakers at the time the Keynesian policies were overtur-
ned. The “one-sector small open economy” perspective had begun to domi-
nate. This holds that all sectors of the economy can be viewed as producing
tradables that the country can sell in unlimited quantities at given world
prices. In this perspective it follows that the necessary financial adjustment
could be achieved without much adverse effect on unemployment and so,
the argument went, public sector job losses were to be avoided. Further-
more, the tax wedge was not accorded sufficient attention: the job of ba-
lancing the budget, it was thought, could as easily be achieved by raising
taxes as by the more politically-difficult method of cutting spending. And
finally, since the country’s financial problems could be traced back to when
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FIGURE 2 Growth in GDP and in Government Consumption Expenditures
Note: The figure shows only two episodes of clearly counter-cyclical fiscal actions, in the early 1970s and the late
1980s.























Real GDP growth Real growth in govt. consumptionthe “no current deficits rule” had been broken, the task of fiscal correction
was focussed on eliminating the current budget deficit.
The consequences of following this strategy became clear within a few 
years after 1982. Ireland had the fastest growing ratio of tax revenue to
GNP in the OECD, while the growth in current spending relative to GNP
continued. The tax burden raised wage demands, which exacerbated unem-
ployment.7 At the same time the jump in world interest rates left less tax
revenue for other than debt servicing purposes while the rise in unemploy-
ment due both to external and to internal factors automatically destabili-
sed the government budget. The cyclically adjusted deficit declined sub-
stantially but this was not reflected in any decline in the actual budget
deficit. In fact, despite quite severe fiscal contraction in the 1981–84 period
the real current deficit actually rose.
The exchequer borrowing requirement thus remained stubbornly high,
thedebt to GNPratio continued to grow, and despondency set in over thesee-
ming inability of government to get the public finances under control. With
a crisis by now widely perceived it is not so surprising that, contrary to
the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis, the fiscal contraction of the early to
mid-1980s was associated with an increase in the private savings ratio. It
has been argued that the setting of an unrealistic target (i. e. a balanced
current budget) was partly to blame for this crisis of confidence.
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1970/80 1979/86
External factors 1.09 3.00
Domestic policy factors -2.53 4.41
Demographic factors 2.86 0.60
All factors combined 1.19 8.44
Historical data 1.5 10.2
TABLE 2 Decomposition of Unemployment Changes: 1970–86
Note: That the sum of the individual shocks does not add up exactly to the number representing “all factors
combined” is due to the non-linear nature of the model.
Source: (Barry – Bradley, 1991)
1981–85 1985–89 1989–91
Social welfare 687 -7 195
Interest 832 -234 143
Health -33 -73 137
Education 68 121 54
Other current 198 -455 453
Total current 1753 -648 982
EBRa for capital -767 -667 312
TABLE 3 Changes in Real Government Spending, 1991 Irish pounds (millions)
Note: a Exchequer Borrowing Requirement
Source: (Honohan, 1992)
7 As seen in Table 2, Barry and Bradley (1991) find that the fiscal contraction added some four
and a half percentage points to unemployment up to 1986, more than offsetting the reduction
in unemployment achieved over the expansionary period. Adverse external factors (including
high interest rates and the generally weak world economy) added a further three percentage
points to the unemployment rate.The failure to cut government spending Honohan (1989) ascribes to three
factors. First was the operation of automatic stabilisers as unemployment
grew. Second there was a conscious decision to maintain the real value of
welfare payments to shelter the least well-off, and third was the political
make-up of the government: the coalition of “trade union and middle-class
interests without a parliamentary majority failed to agree on the elimina-
tion or curtailment of any significant programmes or to implement real wage
rate reductions in the public service”.
By the end of this period Irish unemployment stood at 17 percent, the se-
cond highest rate in the EU. In line with Fisher’s (1993) analysis, this poor
macroeconomic policymaking must be regarded as the main culprit behind
Ireland’s failure to converge over this period.
What was happening at the sectoral level at this time? Agriculture em-
ployment continued on its long-term downward trend, though the opera-
tion of the Common Agricultural Policy contributed significantly to the wel-
fare of those remaining on theland as well as those engaged in agri-business.8
Non-market (public) services rose, as a consequence of the fiscal policies
discussed earlier, as did market services – though at a much slower rate
than that prevailing elsewhere in the EU – see Table 4. Building and uti-
lities fell as a consequence of the generally recessionary environment, while
manufacturing employment also declined.
Within manufacturing, EU entry brought a further substantial increase
in employment in foreign-owned industry, with the number of jobs in this
sector expanding by almost 40 percent between 1973 and 1980. This was to
be expected as a consequence of the integration of a relatively low wage eco-
nomy into the large EU market.9 This expansion was not sufficient to off-
set the decline in indigenous industrial employment however – see Figure 3.
Walsh and Whelan (1999/2000) argue that there were several offsetting
forces acting on indigenous industry. Domestic-market oriented firms in sec-
tors that became internationally tradable after the demise of protectionism
were in terminal decline. Free trade did not transform many of these firms
into successful exporters, making them particularly vulnerable to domestic
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1961 1973 1987 2001
Market services 303 325 393 700
Manufacturing 186 233 215 302
Non-market services 109 152 233 340
Building and utilities 69 102 85 191
Agriculture 372 248 157 107
TOTAL 1039 1060 1083 1641
TABLE 4 Sectoral Employment Levels (thousands)
Source: ESRI/Department of Finance databank
8 In 1976, for example, EU expenditures in relation to Irish agriculture amounted to 2 percent
of GDP, in 1986 the figure was over 4 percent and in 1996 it was 3.5 percent of GDP (Matthews,
various years). The trade effect (which takes into account the difference between EU-supported
Irish export prices and world prices) added another 1.2 percent of GDP in the latter year (Matt-
hews, 2000).recession. It took a considerable period of time however, up until the birth
of the Celtic Tiger era according to these authors, for the last of them to be
cleared from the market.
Those firms which had already been export-oriented, however, and
the new firms that arose (whether export-oriented or supplying to larger
export-oriented firms) even in these traditional sectors did relatively well.
At the same time, new foreign firms were entering in sectors in which Ire-
land had displayed no traditional comparative advantage, and new indige-
nous firms were emerging to supply to them.
The impact of these developments can be seen as follows. While the sec-
toral distribution of employment in domestically-owned industry in Ireland
is quite dissimilar to that in the richer “core” EU economies, the similarity
increases substantially when the sectoral distribution of foreign-owned in-
dustry is taken into account. Furthermore, the distribution within domes-
tic industry has been growing more similar to that in the core, in contrast
to what has been happening in Spain for example (Barrios – Barry – Strobl,
2003). The evidence provided by Görg and Strobl (2002, 2003) suggests that
this arose because of the impact that Ireland’s large foreign-owned sector
had on Irish indigenous entry and survival rates in these sectors.
The consequences of this will become clearer when we now turn to consi-
der the long economic boom of the 1990s.
3. The Celtic Tiger Era
Ireland was subjected in the late 1980s to a series of more or less con-
current beneficial shocks, creating a“virtuous circle” for theeconomy. Theef-
fects were dramatic. Real national income per head rose from less than
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FIGURE 3 Employment in Indigenous and Foreign-owned Manufacturing







































9 There were equivalent FDI booms in Spain and Portugal following their accession in the 1980s.
These tapered off by the mid-1990s, however, while Ireland’s has not, in large part because of
its continuing low-corporation-tax regime.65percent of theEU average to achieve rough parity by theend of the1990s.
Unemployment tumbled from a high of 17 percent in 1987 to less than 4 per-
cent in the early years of the new millennium. Numbers at work expanded
by more than 50 percent.
The beneficial shocks included a change in fiscal strategy in 1987 which
finally resolved the crisis in the public finances. This allowed room for fu-
ture tax reductions, which, in combination with the country’s newly deve-
loped “social partnership model” of wage determination, bolstered compe-
titiveness. Thedoubling of theEU Structural Funds in 1989 allowed arapid
resumption in badly-needed infrastructural projects which had been put
on hold as part of the change in fiscal strategy. Airline deregulation, in
1986, facilitated a more than doubling in tourism numbers over the follo-
wing decade, and finally – crucially – the lead-up to the Single Market saw
a huge increase in FDI flows both into and within Europe, of which Ire-
land captured a sharply increased share. We discuss each of these factors
in turn.
3.1 The New Fiscal Strategy
A combination of factors in 1986–87 paved the way for a new and ulti-
mately successful stabilisation attempt, which relied on cuts in government
spending rather than further increases in taxation. Supportive supply-side
developments included a devaluation of the currency within the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (in response to a sharp fall in the sterling) and an impro-
vement in cost competitiveness against the UK.10 Because of the concur-
rent fiscal contraction, the devaluation proved to yield a long-lasting gain
in international competitiveness. Simultaneous demand-side developments
included the lift-off in the world economy and particularly in the UK in
1987. Politically, the retrenchment process was facilitated by the emergence
of a courageous political opposition leader who backed the government in
its new fiscal strategy.
The actual expenditure reduction was the outcome of exogenous events
as well as government policy, as can be seen in Table 3. The pick-up in
the UK economy drew labour out of Ireland, reducing social welfare spen-
ding. Thus the Social Welfare bill fell even though the real value of social
welfare payments was generally maintained. The National Debt Interest
bill also fell; again this was partly fortuitous, driven by the lower world in-
terest rates of the second half of the 1980s, though the fiscal contraction
also reduced the interest-rate premium on Irish government debt.
The expenditure reductions that did take place consisted of the following:
– apostponement of capital spending projects. During 1983–91 capital spen-
ding fell below its 1982 peak by a cumulative total of almost GBP 8 bil-
lion in 1991 prices;
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10 Around one-third of Irish exports go to the UK, but the significance of the UK market to
the Irish economy is greater than this, since much of the industry exporting there is Irish-ow-
ned and labour-intensive. Over the period 1980–86 UK imports of manufactures rose by more
than 100 percent while manufacturing imports from Ireland grew only 80 percent. In 1986–91
though, imports from Ireland increased by more than total manufacturing imports.– postponement of public service salary increases;
– a recruitment embargo for public services, combined with an early reti-
rement plan. Public sector employment (including the local authorities)
fell by some 24,000 since 1982, yielding a gross savings in pay costs of
around 2 percent of GNP;11
– cash limits for autonomous agencies. Cutbacks in the grant-in-aid to non-
-commercial semi-state bodies achieved considerable expenditure re-
straint in these years.
Stabilisation of thedebt-GNPratio, which had replaced balancing thecur-
rent budget as the target of fiscal policy, was finally achieved at the end
of 1987 when the primary budget (i.e. net of interest payments) also went
into surplus. Control of the current deficit thereafter became very much ea-
sier.
The main elements of the public finances are shown in Table 5.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) argue that the Irish recovery in the years fol-
lowing 1987 represented an example of “expansionary fiscal contraction”.
This was a period in which inflation, unemployment and interest rates all
fell rapidly, while private sector consumption and investment boomed. They
argue that the positive response of the private sector to fiscal consolidation
is especially dramatic under crisis conditions.
Barry and Devereux (1995) argue however that even under these circum-
stances increases in aggregate employment are unlikely, particularly in
the tradable sectors of the economy, unless associated with improved cost
competitiveness. Yet it was precisely in the tradable manufacturing sector
that the strongest employment growth occurred in the years 1987–1990, in
thewake of thefiscal contraction. Manufacturing employment grew by 8per-
cent in this period, well above the average rates for the OECD and EU,
while market services, conventionally thought of as nontradable, grew by
only 6 percent.
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Change in % share of GNP Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D
1977–81 1981–86 1986–89 1989–96
Primary deficit 4.5 -5.4 -9.6 -0.9
Borrowing 6.8 -2.7 -11.1 -4.1
Current deficit 4.8 0.9 -7.4 -2.1
Total tax 3.0 4.8 -0.9 0.3
Cycle-related and predetermined spending
Interest 2.2 2.6 -1.4 -3.3
Transfers 2.2 5.5 -3.0 0.6
Discretionary spending
Wages 3.4 -0.8 -3.4 0.4
Capital 2.5 -3.7 -3.6 1.3
TABLE 5 Main Components of Irish Public Finances over Various Periods
Source: Irish government accounts
11 This was partly funded by the Central Bank bringing forward dividend payments to the go-
vernment; the amounts peaked at a cumulative 0.4 percent of GNP by 1989.There are a number of other reasons to reject the demand-side view.
First of all, the Irish recovery appears much less robust when presented
against the backdrop of world market conditions. Since the Irish and UK
labour markets are closely integrated, the gap between Irish and UK
unemployment is arguably more revealing than the Irish unemployment
rate per se. This gap rose during the period of fiscal contraction, in con-
trast to thedecline experienced during theIrish fiscal expansion of thelate
1970s. Employment growth in Ireland was also less than the UK or EU
averages over this period while emigration proceeded at historically high
levels.
The dramatic fall in Irish inflation (notwithstanding the 1986 devalua-
tion) and the substantial improvement in the current account are also con-
sistent with Irish aggregate demand being weak relative to that of the coun-
try’s trading partners. Barry and Devereux (1995) conclude that “the factors
which were working in the direction of recovery – buoyant world demand,
improvements in cost competitiveness and an inflow of foreign investment
in the lead-up to the Single European Market – more than outweighed
the short-run contractionary effects of fiscal contraction”.
3.2 Social Partnership
In contrast to the demand-side orientation of the expansionary fiscal con-
traction hypothesis, our emphasis is on the supply-side, as appears appro-
priate for a small open economy, as the main determinant of medium-term
growth. The supply-side effects of the fiscal contraction arose through
the scope it provided for future tax reductions.
The year of the change in fiscal strategy, 1987, also saw the introduction
of the “social partnership” approach to wage determination, whereby go-
vernment, unions and employers came together to agree on a general path
for wages over the following three years. Successive governments have used
the process to purchase wage moderation via the promise of future tax cuts,
and these tax cuts have accounted for about one-third of the rise in real
take-home pay since the partnership process began.12
Many commentators argue, furthermore, that the partnership approach
promotes a shared understanding of key economic mechanisms and appro-
priate responses to external shocks between the groups involved.
3.3 The Structural and Cohesion Funds
Following reform and reorganisation in 1988 the level of EU regional aid
increased substantially. Between 1989 and 1999 aid flows to Ireland through
the Structural and Cohesion Funds amounted to almost 3 percent of GDP
per annum, an amount similar to that flowing into the country via the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy. The timing of the increased aid was fortuitous in
that it allowed a rapid resumption of the badly-needed infrastructural pro-
405 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 53, 2003, ã. 9-10
12 The standard and top rates of income tax both fell by around 10 percentage points between
1988 and 1998, and the thresholds at which they applied were raised in real terms.jects which had been put on hold as part of the fiscal contraction of
the 1987–89 period.
The aid flows to Ireland are spent in almost equal proportions on human-
-resource development, on physical infrastructure and on production and
investment aids to the private sector. If we take educational attainment
data as a measure of human resource development and business enterprise
expenditure on R&D as a measure of the health of the industrial sector,
Barry (2003a) shows that the EU aid can be determined to have helped Ire-
land converge in terms of these target areas at least. In terms of physical
infrastructure, the European Commission (2001) admits that “while in-
vestment in peripheral regions has improved accessibility, it has been
accompanied by similar investment in neighbouring regions and more cent-
ral ones, which can counteract any relative gain”. In this respect then, it
may have done no more than prevent further divergence.
Careful analysis has shown however that thedirecteffectson GDPof these
EU regional aid programmes would have been modest. In the Irish case
Barry, Bradley and Hannan (2001) estimate that they would have contri-
buted a maximum of about half of 1 percentage point per annum to the GDP
growth rate of the 1990s, whereas the boom saw Irish average real growth
exceeding that of the EU15 by around 6 percent per annum.13
By “direct effects” we mean the increased demand associated with EU
transfers plus the supply-side effects associated with an improved stock of
human capital and physical infrastructure, evaluated on the assumption
that the response of Irish output is in line with estimates emerging from
the international empirical literature. Barry (2003a) explores further pos-
sible indirect effects that the aid may have had however, suggesting that
their interaction with other concurrent developments in the Irish economy
may have made them particularly beneficial in the Irish case.
One of these indirect effects, the serendipity of their timing in the wake
of the fiscal contraction, has already been discussed. The aid flows would
also have facilitated the social partnership agreements by relaxing the go-
vernment budget constraint, both directly (to the extent to which the prin-
ciple of additionality can be side-stepped) and indirectly through the tax re-
venues associated with the increased FDI inflows that subsequently
emerged.14
A second indirect effect concerns the impact of aid on the efficiency of
the public administration system. As FitzGerald (1998) notes with reference
to Ireland: “The need to satisfy the donor countries, through the EU Com-
mission, that their money is well spent has resulted in the introduction of
a set of evaluation procedures which has helped change the way the admi-
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13 As the OECD (1999, footnote 32) points out however, even this apparently modest effect ne-
vertheless represents quite a respectable internal rate of return, of 6 to 7 percent per annum,
on the funds invested.
14 It would nevertheless be incorrect to conclude that EU aid generated the Irish boom by faci-
litating income tax reductions. Corporation tax is the most important tax relevant to the count-
ry’s ability to attract FDI (Barry, 2003c). This has actually increased over time, from the zero
rating on profits stemming from manufacturing exports that was introduced in the late 1950s,
to a standard rate of 12.5 percent today.nistration approaches public expenditure. In the past the only question,
once money had been voted by parliament, was whether it had been spent
in accordance with regulations. Now there is increasing interest in asses-
sing how effective the expenditure has been.”
A further point of relevance is that the effectiveness of aid expenditures
differs in different labour-market environments. The marginal product of
public capital will be higher the more flexible the labour market is because
it will be combined with higher utilisation rates of the other productive fac-
tors, labour and private capital. Ireland, of course, approached full employ-
ment over the course of the 1990s, unlike Spain for example.
The final indirect effect considered relates to the interaction between
the aid programmes and Ireland’s FDI-oriented development strategy. In-
frastructural constraints would have emerged far earlier in the boom had
it not been for the EU funding of new infrastructures. Besides expanding
the level of FDI inflows that the economy could handle, the aid would also
have impacted on the type of FDI Ireland was able to attract. Foreign in-
dustry in Ireland has been becoming increasingly high-tech over recent de-
cades, and this type of FDI is reliant on a steady supply of skilled labour,
to which the human-resource programmes of the Structural Funds have
contributed. Ireland’s increasing levels of R&D funding are likely to have
had similar effects.
3.4 FDI Inflows
The final beneficial shock to which the economy was subject in the late
1980s was the development of the Single Market. This led to a doubling (in
real terms) in the amount of investment undertaken by US firms in the EU
between the early and the late 1980s.
Ireland’s share of these investments actually quadrupled over this period.
Why? Barry, Gorg and Strobl (2003) present evidence that both “efficiency
agglomerations” and “demonstration effects” were of importance in this re-
gard. The (Marshallian) efficiency agglomerations, which determine that
firms will locate close to others in the same industrial sector, arise because
of (i) the importance of knowledge spillovers, (ii) the advantages provided
by thick markets in specialised factors (particularly labour), and (iii) be-
cause of the scope for backward and forward linkages between customer
and supplier firms. Demonstration effects arise as firms respond to the fact
that others in the sector appear to have found a particular location to be
advantageous. The importance of the latter is illustrated by the fact that
surveys of executives of newly arriving foreign companies in the computer,
instrument engineering, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors indicate that
their location decision is now strongly influenced by the fact that other key
market players are already located in Ireland.
Perhaps even more important however was the liberalisation of public
procurement policies that the Single Market entailed. This prevented lar-
ger EU countries from using the threat of blacklisting publicly-funded pur-
chases of a firm’s products as a lever to influence their location decisions,
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Sharry – White, 2000).
The number of jobs in foreign-owned industry grew by 40 percent be-
tween 1987 and 1999, the era of the Single Market and the worldwide high-
-tech boom – almost the same growth that had been recorded in the period
after EU entry.
Input-output linkages between the foreign and indigenous sectors have
also expanded considerably over the years. Forfás, the Irish state agency,
regularly publishes an Irish-economy expenditures survey which provides
data on the wages paid and Irish materials and services purchased by fo-
reign and indigenous firms, as well as indigenous-firm profits and corpo-
ration tax revenues received from foreign firms.15 These data show that real
Irish economy expenditures per employee rose by around 50 percent be-
tween 1983 and 1995 for both types of firms.
Notwithstanding the fact that Irish economy expenditures per emplo-
yee are lower for foreign industry, the employment that the latter creates
is estimated to be higher because of the greater share of spending direc-
ted towards services – in contrast on the indigenous sector, for whom
the bulk of spending goes to materials. A ballpark estimate is suggested
of around one hundred service sector jobs and ten indigenous manufac-
turing jobs created via backward-linkages per one hundred foreign ma-
nufacturing jobs.
The FDI inflows of the period contributed to a further diversification of
Irish export markets, as the foreign-owned sector in particular has increa-
sed its orientation towards the US.16 The changing destination of Irish ex-
ports over time is depicted in Table 6.
4. Conclusions
There are important lessons to be drawn from the Irish experience over
each of the periods considered here. Analysis of the 1950s warns that pro-
tectionism, in small economies at least, will ultimately run out of steam.
Ireland opened up to free trade in the 1960s. Foreign export-oriented in-
dustry began to operate out of Ireland but indigenous industry remained
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15 Forfás is the Irish national policy and advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, techno-
logy and innovation.
16 The share of the output of US firms based in Ireland that was exported to the US grew from
9.5 percent in 1995 to 17.6 percent in 1999.
1975 1985 1990 1995 2000
Asia excluding USSR 2.6 5.5 5.2 7.6 11.1
EU15 minus UK 27.9 39.6 44.2 46.8 39.9
UK 54.2 33.0 33.7 25.4 21.8
US 6.3 10.1 11.7 14.5 17.2
TABLE 6 Irish Export Destinations (shares as a percent of all exports)
Source: UN International Trade Statisticsoverly focused on the domestic market. This was to prove extremely detri-
mental in the 1970s when full trade liberalisation occurred, and in
the 1980s when the domestic economy stagnated.
The coincidence of strong wage growth alongside high unemployment and
high emigration suggests agreat deal of inflexibility in theIrish labour mar-
ket of thetime, and this appears to be themain factor accounting for thelack
of convergence over the 1960s at least. It impacted adversely on investment
and would have made it particularly difficult for the labour-intensive sec-
tors, in which most indigenous firms were located, to prosper.
The situation worsened over the 1970s and particularly the 1980s as a re-
sult of misguided fiscal policies. A strong pro-cyclical expansion was engi-
neered which gave some stimulus to the economy. When it was ultimately
reversed, due to the build-up in debt and debt-service payments, the pro-
-cyclical contraction was far more powerful in the opposite direction.
At the same time, however, some beneficial developments were taking
place behind the scenes. The economy’s stock of human capital was ex-
panding through education, facilitating the attempt to raise the quality of
FDI inflows. As the older home-market oriented indigenous firms died out
– with detrimental employment effects – they were gradually replaced by
more dynamic firms which were either export-oriented themselves or were
engaged in supplying to the export sectors. Thus Ireland had a more pro-
mising pool of firms to begin with when conditions improved in the late
1980s.
The lessons from the Celtic Tiger era have already been spelt out else-
where, e.g. in (Barry, 2000). It is clear that fiscal profligacy is detrimental
to the economy. Tax cuts may then be beneficial, particularly if they pro-
mote wage moderation, though in Ireland today, after a decade of tax-cut-
ting, the main item on the political agenda is the resulting poor quality and
inadequate levels of infrastructure and public services. This suggests that
the tax-cutting regime may have been taken too far.
Other types of labour-market institutions appear equally capable of 
promoting wage moderation and industrial peace. One recalls Eichen-
green’s (1996) argument that the wage moderation negotiated in exchange
for the development of a strong social infrastructure was key to post-war
Western European economic development.
With respect to EU aid, it is important to recognise that it alone cannot
guarantee convergence. This will be obvious from the experience of the Ita-
lian Mezzogiorno for example. It is likely to be of greatest benefit when
the other conditions for real convergence are satisfied.
Though Ireland’s development strategy has been based substantially on
attracting inward FDI in high-tech manufacturing sectors, other countries
have successfully followed alternative paths. Portugal for example has ex-
perienced substantial real convergence with a manufacturing sector that
remains dominated by indigenous low-tech industry. Labour-market flexi-
bility appears to be particularly important along this development path.17
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17 Some of the features accounting for the flexibility of the Portuguese labour market include
low unemployment protection, low levels of unionisation and the existence of supplementary
jobs in agriculture (Corkill, 1999).Finland represents another interesting case – of a geographically periphe-
ral though not historically poor country – which has prospered through in-
digenous high-tech industry.
A danger inherent in the Irish development strategy is the continuing
structural weakness of the indigenous sector. This is frequently masked by
the strength of the economy’s foreign sector. Indigenous manufacturing
firms still have a relatively low export-output ratio (of less than one-third).
They are strongly dependent on the UK market, and are even more highly
exposed to sterling fluctuations. They are primarily located in low-tech sec-
tors, and engage in very little R&D. Hence the economy is vulnerable in
the event of circumstances impinging on its ability to attract foreign in-
dustry.
Some Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary and Es-
tonia have followed Ireland in adopting low corporation-tax rates to attract
export-oriented FDI. Others however, including the Czech Republic, have
rates that are not much different from those prevailing in most EU count-
ries. The Portuguese and Finnish experiences – amongst others – suggest
that this will not necessarily hinder real convergence prospects for the CEE
economies. Each development path requires a particular constellation of
advantageous factors however. A high degree of labour-market flexibility
appears to be required if countries are to successfully follow the low-tech
Portuguese route, while a strong R&D environment, a high level of indu-
strial sophistication and an abundance of human capital would appear to
be required if the Finnish development path is to be replicated.
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This paper draws out lessons from Ireland’s economic experience over the course
of EU membership. The author starts with a description of the effects of opening up
to free trade, and highlights the problems of the 1970s and 1980s that arose as a con-
sequence of misguided fiscal policy. He then turns to the beneficial developments
that paved the way to the emergence of the “Celtic Tiger” economy. EU aid alone,
he argues, cannot guarantee convergence. It is likely to be of greatest benefit when
the other conditions for real convergence – including a well-functioning labour mar-
ket, reform-oriented microeconomic policy and macroeconomic stability – are also
in place. For countries attempting to follow the Irish strategy of attracting inward
FDI in high-tech manufacturing sectors, the author emphasises that low corpora-
tion-tax rates are only one part of the story. A supportive public administration sys-
tem and an abundance of human capital of the appropriate type are also key re-
quirements.
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